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NOTES.
CARRIERS-JURISDICTION-DISCRIMINATION

IN THE SUPPLY OF

CARs-The United States Supreme Court has recently handed down
two opinions relating to the subject of discrimination by a carrier in
its distribution of cars.' In the light of previous decisions and the
doctrine of the Abilene case, 2 giving the Interstate Commerce Commission jurisdiction in case of alleged unreasonableness of rates,
these opinions are of interest at least to the student and of possible
regret to those who have been following with satisfaction the tending
of the Supreme Court to extend rather than to limit the powers of
the Commission in dealing with railroad problems generally.
In I9O2, at the time of the anthracite coal strike, there came a
sudden demand for cars for the bituminous mines along the Pennsylvania Railroad. 3 At this time the railroad governed its car dis-

'Penna. R. R. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co., 35 S. C. R. 484 (April, 1915);
Eastern Ry. Co. of New Mexico v. Littlefield, 35 S. C. P. 489 (April, 195).
"Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426 (igoi).
'Discussion deals with the Puritan Coal Co. case only. The Eastern Ry.
(787)
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tribution
by a schedule predicated upon the output of the various
mines. When
this great demand for cars came the railroad ceased
to abide by this schedule and, according to the allegations of the
Puritan Coal Mining Company, failed to supply it with the number
of cars that according to the railroad's own schedule it should have
had. Moreover, it was alleged that other mines received a greater
number than they were entitled to under the schedule. The Puritan
Coal Mining Company sued in the county court for damages for
unlawful discrimination extending over a period of several years.
Recovery was allowed and this was affirmed by the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania.4 This judgment the Supreme Court of the United
States has now sustained. In substance the court holds "that the
Puritan Company was entitled to recover because of the fact that
the carrier failed to comply with its common law liability to furnish
it with a proper number of cars". What was the proper number was
a question of fact and the determination of this, the court said, came
properly within the jurisdiction of the State court. In support of
the alleged discrimination the plaintiff relied on the railroad's own
schedule as evidence.
Section Three of the Interstate Commerce Act makes it
unlawful for a carrier to give undue preference to one shipper over
another.5 Section Eight gives a right of action against the carrier
for the doing of anything prohibited by the Act.6 Section Nine then
provides that any person alleging damage by a carrier subject to
the Act may make complaint before the Commission or may bring
suit for damages in any federal court of competent jurisdiction. T
This last section would appear to restrict all complaints relative to
of New Mexico case was decided directly on the authority of the Puritan case
and on substantially the same facts.

Pa. 420

'237

(1912).

' Sect. 3 : "It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to the
provisions of this act to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference
or advantage to any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality,
or any particular description of traffic, in any respect whatever, or to subject
any particular person, company, firm, corporation, or locality, or any particular description of traffic, to any undue or unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage in any respect whatsoever!'
' Sect. 8: "That in case any common carrier subject to the provisions of
this act shall do, cause to be done, or permit to be done any act, matter, or
thing in this act prohibited or declared to be unlawful, or shall omit to do
any act, matter, 9r thing in this act required to be done, such common carrier
shall be liable to the person or persons injured for the full amount of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of the provisions of this
act

.

.

'Sect. 9: "That any person or persons claiming to be damaged by any
common carrier subject to the provisions of this act may either make complaint to the Commission as hereinafter provided for, or may bring suit in
is or their own behalf for the recovery of the damages for which such
common carrier may be liable under the provisions of this act, in any district
or circuit court of the United States of competent jurisdiction; . .

NOTES

interstate commerce to adjudication before the Commission or in
the federal courts. To avoid this, Section Twenty-two provides that
"Nothing in this Act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the
remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies". Relying on this
common law obligation and also on the statute of Pennsylvania'
forbidding unreasonable discrimination, both of which were reserved
to the shipper by Section Twenty-two, the Puritan Company sued in
the State court and recovered.
The leading case to affirmatively establish the extensive powers
of the Interstate Commerce Commission is the Abilene Oil Company
case. In that case the railroad had filed its rates with the Commission. The plaintiff, relying on Section Twenty-two of the Act,
sought the State court's jurisdiction to declare certain rates unreasonable. But the Supreme Court of the United States held that
notwithstanding this section no State court could declare unreasonable rates which had been filed with the Commission and which had
not been declared unreasonable by that body. The same principle
was applied in Robinson v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad,0 the only
difference being that in that case discrimination rather than unreasonableness was alleged. In both cases the carriers had strictly
observed the filed and published tariffs and were held exempt from
the common law liability which appeared to exist under Section
Twenty-two of the Act. The court said that a strict observance of
that section would defeat the very purpose of the Act which had provided for an expert commission to decide upon discrimination and
unreasonableness. Following the principle of the Abilene case it
was held in the Pitcairn case " that the United States Circuit Court
could not issue a writ of mandamus, as provided for by Section
Twenty-three of the Act, compelling a railroad to put into effect a
schedule of car distribution which it, the Circuit Court, thought
What was a proper method was
proper and non-discriminatory."
for the Commission and complaint must be made there and the Commission must have found it discriminatory or unreasonable before
any court could act.
In Morrisdalc Coal Company v. Pennsylvania Railroad' s it
would appear that the Supreme Court had even extended this previous doctrine of the Abilene and Pitcairn case, and it is with this
case that we find it difficult to reconcile our two principal cases.
Here the railroad had its own schedule for car distribution but this
schedule was not filed with the Commission. Suit was brought in
"Act June 4, 1883, P. L.
'Supra, note 2.

72.

10223 U. S. 5o6 (i912).

' B. & 0. R. R. v. Pitcairn Coal Co., 215 U. S. 48, (91o).
"See also I. C. C. v. Ill. Central R. R., 215 U. S. 452 (1Io).
3230 U. S. 304 (1913).

90

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

14 of the Act to recover damthe Circuit Court under Section Nine
5
The railroad in this case had
ages for violation of Section Three.
observed its schedule but the plaintiff contended that the schedule
was discriminatory. As in the Pitcairn case, the Supreme Court held
that the Circuit Court could not put into effect for future conduct
such rules of car distribution as it, the Circuit Court, thought nondiscriminatory, so in the Morrisdale case the court said that the Circuit Court could not award damages which had resulted from the
enforcement of a rule that the Circuit Court considered discriminatory. Again the court said that it was for the Interstate Commerce Commission to say whether or not such rule was discriminatory or not. But now come our principal cases and with these
leading decisions to go by, each apparently increasing the power of
the Commission in the matter of determining what is discriminatory,
the Supreme Court holds flatly that the State court had jurisdiction
under Section Twenty-two of the Act. In the Puritan case, as in
the Morrisdale case, the railroad had a schedule for car distribution, and as in that case also such schedule was not filed with the
Commission.

"But," said the court, ".

.

.

there are two forms

of discrimination--one in the rule and the other in the manner of
its enforcement." In the Morrisdale case the schedule itself was attacked as unreasonable and the court said that that question was
for the Commission to decide. In the Puritan case the schedule was
not attacked as unreasonable; rather it was alleged and proven that
the railroad had distributed according to its schedule. This is what
was meant by the two kinds of discrimination. This distinction is
made the basis of the court's opinion. Is it a real distinction? After
stating how the two cases differ the court says: "The plaintiff
alleged it was damaged by reason of the carrier's failure to furnish
it with cars to which it was entitled." The court held that this allegation gave rise to a good cause of action in the State court and
that the coal company was there entitled to prove the facts alleged.
But to what number of cars was the plaintiff entitled? How can it
be said that "on the trial there was no administrative question as to
the reasonableness of the rule but only a claim for damages occasioned by its violation in failing to furnish cars"? Did the fact that
the railroad itself had fixed the rule (schedule) make that such
a rule that any deviation therefrom would amount to discrimination?
So the court seemed to say. Yet as a matter of fact the Interstate
Commerce Commission later declared this very schedule discriminatory.'8 In spite of this- the State court was allowed to award
damages for failure to abide by -this rule-later declared discrim7
inatory.Y
4

Supra, note 7.

" Supra, note 5.

, Hillsdale Coal & Coke Co. v. Penna. R. R., ig I. C. C. Rep. 356 (igio).
It is admitted that the question raised in our principal case was reserved
in the Morrisdale Case (supra, note 13), at page 314.
I

NOTES

Through all these cases it has been said that "the question as to
the reasonableness of a rule of car distribution is administrative in
its character and calls for the exercise of the powers and discretion
conferred by Congress upon the Commission". Is it less administrative in its character when damages are being sought for a failure
to abide by a purely railroad-made rule which had not been filed?
Allowing such recovery is doing one of two things. It is either
allowing a State court to determine what is a proper rule without
the previous judgment of the Commission, or it is saying that the
mere fact that a railroad has a schedule is proof that such schedule
is non-discriminatory. The former is certainly against the principle
laid down in the Abilene, Robinson and Pitcairn cases. The latter,
in view of the later finding by the Commission that the rule was of
itself discriminatory, seems unwise to say the least.
One is tempted to believe that the court may have been influenced by Mr. Justice Pitney's dissent in the Morrisdale case '8 and
in two other cases decided at that same time.' 9 His idea was that
these three decisions were unnecessarily eliminating the force of
Section Nine of the Act which allowed the United States courts jurisdiction. He argued that the opinion in the Abilene case is logical:
That where it is a question of laying out schedules for future observance it is entirely proper to make the ruling of the Commission
supreme and to deny to any court the right to say that such is unreasonable or discriminatory. "But to so apply that reasoning as to
make it support the contention that discriminations by the carrier
in the past, amounting to a departure by the carrier from the established schedule . . . and where the conduct of the carrier has
no prima facie sanction under the law by reason of the filing and
publishing of a schedule or otherwise, shall not be actionable in the
ordinary course of law without previous investigation or determination by the Commission is not only to ignore the essential differences
between the facts in this case"0 and those in the Abilene case, but
is to virtually elintinate Section Nine of the Interstate Commerce
Act ..
.,,2 It is suggested that this language may have had
some bearing on the present decisions.
H. I.
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-INTERSTATE

COMMERCE-WEBB-KEN-

YoN AcT-The history of the development, both by judicial decision

and by legislation, of the States' power to control the sale of liquor
23230

U. S. at page 267.

' Penna. R. R. Co. v. International Coal Co., 230 U. S. 184 (1913) ; Mitchell Coal & Coke Co. v. Penna. R. R. Co., 23o U. S. 247 (1913).

"Mitchell

Coal Co. Case, supra, note 19; Morrisdale Coal Co. Case,

supra, note 13.
=23o U. S. at page 296.
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within their own borders, is of particular interest at present owing
to the almost universal agitation of the prohibition question.
In the License Cases 1 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the sale of intoxicating liquor which was a part of interstate commerce might be prohibited by a State even in the absence2
of a federal law. But this decision was overruled in Leisy v. Hardin,
which decided that the interstate shipment of liquor was a matter of
national concern and that the States could not regulate it. In this
decision the Supreme Court invoked the doctrine of Cooley v. Port
Wardens of Philadelphia,3 and also the doctrine of the silence of
Congress, saying that as Congress had not broken its silence this
showed clearly that the will of Congress was that the subject should
be left unregulated by the States in this, a matter of national concern. The next step was the passage of the Wilson Act,4 which
provided in substance that the States might forbid the sale of liquor
imported from other States in the original package, thus doing away
with the result of Leisy v. Hardin. This act was held constitutional
in In re Rahrer1 on the ground that Congress had broken its silence,
thereby giving the States power to pass laws forbidding the sale in
the original package. There are also passages in the opinion which
seem to stand for the proposition that Congress may determine when
interstate commerce shall begin and end, or in other words to define
interstate commerce. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller said:6a "No reason
is perceived why, if Congress chooses to provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule
which divests them of that character at an earlier period of time
than would otherwise be the case, it is not within its competency to
do so." The latest step was the passage of the Webb-Kenyon Act,'
which substantially prohibits the shipment or transportation of liquor
from one State to another when it is to be received or possessed or
in any manner used in violation of State laws. This apparently removes the last obstacle to absolute State control of the liquor question as there is now no difference, as far as State regulation goes,
between liquor manufactured within the State and that brought in
in interstate commerce; it has always been admitted that a State
under its police power could forbid the manufacture or sale of liquor
made within its borders.'
IS How. 504 (1847).
*135
U. S. 1oo (1889).

*12
How. 299 (1851): "Whatever subjects of this power are in their
nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation,
may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by
Congress."
'Act Aug. 8, i8go, c. 728; 26 Stat. 313; U. S. CPmp. St. igol, page 3177.
'140 U. S. 545 (i89i).
'%At page 562.
'Act March 1, 1913, c. 9o; 37 Stat. 699; U. S. Comp. St. 19r3, §8739.
T
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887).

NOTES

Although there is no decision of the Supreme Court on the
constitutionality of this act there have been several decisions of
lower courts advancing different theories to support it. In this connection the recent case of State of West Virginia v. Adams Express
Company 8 is of interest in that the Circuit Court of Appeals of the
Fourth Circuit decided in favor of the constitutionality of the act.
The attack made on it was that it was an attempt by Congress to
confer on the States the power to regulate interstate commerce and
therefore unconstitutional. The Circuit Court, however, took the
position that since Congress has power to outlaw and exclude absolutely from interstate commerce liquor or any other deleterious substance, it also has the power to exclude them conditionally, the condition being that if the particular State has prohibited the sale of
liquor within its borders the Act of Congress will operate. From
analogy to the lottery, white slave and pure food laws 9 it is a fair
inference that Congress could pass an act absolutely prohibiting the
interstate shipment of liquor, but it is submitted that to prohibit
such shipment on the condition stated is in fact a delegation by
Congress of the right to regulate interstate comnmerce.
Another interesting argument is that advanced by the court of
last resort of Delaware,' 0 which is based on the presumption that In
re Rahrer decided that Congress had the power to define interstate
commerce, as was undoubtedly intimated in that case. The Delaware
court holds that if Congress can allow the States to forbid the sale
of liquor in the original package why should it not take the extra
step and declare, as it did in the Webb-Kenyon Act, that no liquor
may be shipped into a State contrary to the laws of that State? In
other words, the sale of liquor in the original package is just as much
a part of interstate commerce as its transportation, and if Congress
can divest the former of its interstate commerce character, why
should it not be able to do the same with respect to the latter? This
argument is striking, but the fallacy is that the power of Congress to
regulate does not include the power to define. What interstate commerce is, is not a question for Congress but for the Supreme Court
of the United States, to decide. If it is true that Congress can decide
the question it is hard to perceive what, if any, limitations there are
on Congress as far as the power to regulate interstate commerce is
concerned.
It is clear that if Congress should pass an act providing that
a railroad running from New York City to Trenton, New Jersey,
should not be construed as an interstate carrier, this would be unconstitutional because it is not a question which Congress is competent
a219 Fed. Rep. 794 (1915).

'The constitutionality of these acts are discussed in: Lottery Cases, 188
321 (1902); Hoke v. U. S., 227 U. S. 308 (1912); Hipolete Egg Co. v.
220 U. S. 45 (191o).

U. S.
U. S.,

10State

v. Grier, 88 Atl. Rep. 579 (Del. 1913).
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to decide. But the Supreme Court would have to decide whether
or not, under the Commerce Clause this is constitutional. Thus
when the Supreme Court has decided as it did in Brozwt v. Maryland "I that interstate commerce does not end till after the sale in the
original package, how can Congress override this express exposition
of the Constitution by defining that interstate commerce shall end
at an earlier period, or in other words, say what is and what is not
interstate commerce? If this be true what is the function of the
judiciary?
Therefore it would seem that the doctrine of the silence of Congress, which has been severely criticized as an unjustifiable rule with
no real basis in fact, is the only ground on which the Webb-Kenyon
Act can be upheld: That as the matter is one of national concern
the silence of Congress before the passage of the Wilson Act meant
that Congress wanted the subject left unregulated. The Wilson
Act broke the silence of Congress and allowed the States a certain
amount of regulation. By the Webb-Kenyon Act Congress has again
broken its silence and allowed the States absolute control. The reason why this is not a delegation of power is that the silence of Congress placed a bar on State action and therefore, although the States
always had the innate power to act they could not do so till Congress
lifted the bar. In other words, this is not a delegation of new power
to the States but a lifting of the barrier which prevented the exercise of a power which the States always had.
But if the doctrine of the silence of Congress be sound, the prohibition on a State's power to regulate interstate commerce in a
matter of national concern does not reside in the Constitution ipso
facto, but only when Congress by its silence shows that it wants the
subject left unregulated. It is difficult to believe that the framers
of the Constitution could have intended that the right of the States
to so regulate could be dependent on the action or non-action of
Congress. However this is a well recognized doctrine.
In any event it will be of the greatest interest to see how the
Supreme Court will decide this question, because its decision will
go a long way toward determining whether the power to regulate
interstate commerce is exclusively in Congress, or concurrent between
that body and the States,--a question which has been agitated since
the adoption of the Constitution.
I. W. L.
DEEDs-RELEASE OR COVENANT NOT TO SuE-Those whose
delight is in giving effect to what they would persons had said,
rather than to what persons actually found it convenient to say, will
herald as the attainment of their ideal the decision of Dwy v. Connecticut Company, in which the words "remise, release and dis12 Wheat. 419 (1827).

NOTES

charge" were held, by reason of a subsequent reservation of rights
against another joint tortfeasor, to mean "covenant not to sue". 1 To
date, this is the boldest application of a doctrine of interpretation of
sealed instruments, which has been steadily gaining ground 2 and
which will probably, save perhaps in the most conservative jurisdictions, eventually destroy the concept of a release under seal with a
reservation (valid or void) of the right to proceed against other
joint tortfeasors. This is the peculiarity of the Dwy case and its
predecessors, that, while the effect of a release is recognized, yet, by
rules of interpretation, the effect is negatived. The rule of interpretation is thus: A release under seal of one joint tortfeasor will
.release all, although right of action against the others is specifically
reserved, and despite the intention of the parties that it shall not
have that effect, but this instrument has not that effect because it
is not a release; it is not a release, because there is a reservation of
rights against the other joint tortfeasors. Since the rule of law is
too solidly imbedded to be overthrown by the intention of the parties, it was the intention of the parties to create a situation to which
the rule of law does not apply.
The justification for a court to declare that one word means
another is somewhat dependent upon the relation between the two
words or phrases. It is well, then, in the first place to find what
is the theoretical and what the practical difference between a release
of a tortfeasor and a covenant not to sue a tortfeasor. A release-is
a discharge from liability, a denial that the releasee is under further
obligation to the releasor.3 Since it goes to the root of the injury
sustained it is pleadable in bar of an action for the tort.4 The releasee being liable for the entire injury, release of his liability is
release of all liability, so a release under seal of one joint tortfeasor
is a release of all.5 The release having, by operation of law, this
192 Atl. Rep. 883 (Conn. 1915). The words of the one instrument were,
"I have remised, released and forever discharge and do hereby, etc., remise,
release and forever discharge to the said Fred T. Ley & Co., of and from all
debts, etc., especially on account of injuries received on May 6, 1913, I
hereby reserving my right to sue any other party or parties". The other also
under seal: "I, for $ioo and other valuable consideration, do hereby release
and discharge Fred T. Ley & Co. from all claims for damages on account of

accident and make no claim against him or hereby reserving my right to sue
any other party or parties." The two were treated as identical.
2In Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455 (I9O3),

it is not certain whether the

instrument was under seal; in Duck v. Mayer [1892] 2 Q. B. 511, it certainly was not; in McDonald v. Grocery Co., 1i S. W. Rep. (Mo. 1914),
obiter; in Smith v. Dixie Park & Amusement Co., 157 S. W. Rep. goo (Tenn.
1913), and Musolf v. Duluth Elec. Co., io8 Minn. 369 (igog), the words
themselves were rather of a covenant not to sue than of a release, the former
case recognizing that if a release, the reservation was bad.

' Cooper

v. Keady, 144 Pac. Rep. 99 (Ore. 1914).
' Clark v. American Bridge Co., i9o Ill. App. 134 (913).

Parry Manufacturing Co. v. Crull, ior N. E. Rep. 756 (Ind. 1913). This
is true although the person released was not in fact liable, Seither v. Philadel-
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effect, any reservation of rights against others is repugnant and
void.' A covenant not to sue a joint tortfeasor is absolutely noncommittal as to the liability of the covenantee and is a mere covenant
not to prosecute any claim which the covenantor might have (not
might have had) against the covenantee. Since the covenantee himself is not relieved from liability, a fortiori his co-tortfeasors are not
relieved, regardless of the nature of the instrument containing the
agreement not to sue or of the presence therein of a reservation of
rights clause.' Since the consideration for the covenant not to sue
is paid by reason of an injury sustained, it is compensation therefor
and is a discharge pro tanto of the other joint tortfeasors, so that
there can be no argument of public policy against a covenant not
to sue, since the covenantor may at all events proceed against one or
as many as he pleases, but can never get more than full compensation for his injury. The right of the covenantee to recover back
from the covenantor whatever may have been received by the covenantor in an action by him in breach of the covenant, makes the
covenant not to sue ultimately as full a discharge as is a release.
To simplify the question it may be conceded that the only practical
difference between a covenant not to sue and a release is that by the
former, only the covenantee is relieved from liability, while by the
latter all joint tortfeasors are released.
If the Dwy case were decided on some other ground than the
interpretation of an instrument under seal, the last of a substantial
(so far as the relation of the immediate parties is concerned) difference between the two terms would be of great importance. As
Professor Wigmore has said, there is no magic in words, for, as
symbols used by persons, they mean what the parties intended them
to mean. But in arriving at the intention of the parties there are
several rules restricting the broad interpretation of an instrument.
First, persons do not always act according to their best intent. They
may release when if better advised, they would have covenanted not
to sue. Second, parties may intend what the law will not allow them
to effectuate. If the parties here entered into a release and intended
it not to affect liability of others, it is clear what they intended, but
the condition being repugnant, will not be enforced. Third, where
there are more parties than one to an instrument, the meaning of
the words must be restricted to that meaning understood by both
parties. Fourth, the rule that an instrument shall be so interpreted
ut res magis valeat, quam pereat has no application where the meanphia Traction Co., 125 Pa. 397 (I889) ; Casey v. Auburn Telephone Co., 55
App. Div. 66 (N. Y. 1913).
'Flynn v. Manson, ig Cal. App. 400 (912); Bride v. Scott, 132 Mich.
176 T(1913).
Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91 (i912) ; Parry Manufacturing Co. v.
Crull, supra, note 5.
"Gore v. Hunstin, I65 Ill. App. 222 (1912).

NOTES

ing is clear but unable to be effectuated, its proper application being
to the adoption of one of two possible meanings. It seems too
clear for argument that the intention of the parties here was that
there should be an absolute discharge from liability of the one joint
tortfeasor, but that that absolute release was not to have the effect
of releasing others. If there exists a condition void for repugnancy
(and it seems there have been some) this seems to be in that class.
The fact that, under the old state of things, an evil was felt,
can no longer be denied. There must be a change and what remedy
is open if not the one suggested in the Dwy case? It is against
logic to allow a reservation after an absolute release and it is against
sense to say that a release is not intended in almost all cases. May
a remedy be suggested humbly and with trepidation on the theory
that a positive commanding paternalism is more tolerable than a
cowardly misinterpreting paternalism? There seems to be somewhat of an analogy between a release and a penalty in this respect,
that the one is a receipt of less than full compensation (shown by
reservation clause), the other a promise to pay' more than full compensation. The penalty, although intended, is held good only so
far as it provides for substantial justice for the parties; hence recognizing the release as to the parties to it, but refusing to enforce it
against others, not because it is none the less a release, but because
it is better policy and prejudices none of the parties to it, to give it
that effect. The net result is the same as in the Dwy case.

J. F. H.
LEGAL ETHICS-CHAMPERTY AND MAINTENANCE-ELEMENTS-

Notwithstanding the promulgation of a Code of legal ethics by the
American Bar Association, and its adoption by the bar associations
of thirty States,1 the courts have frequently indicated that their opinions will be guided by legal rather than ethical considerations, so
that although a transaction may be legally unethical, it may, nevertheless, be not illegal. A recent decision 2 by the Supreme Court of
Minnesota, one of the States which has adopted this Code, is an
excellent illustration of the distinction. Attorneys solicited 8 the
claim of one Johnson for personal injuries against a railroad company. The solicitation was successful and Johnson employed them
under a contingent fee contract, by which they were to receive for
their services one-third of any amount recovered by suit or settlement. The client was advised, however, not to settle, on the ground
that heavy damages might be obtained by a jury trial. The attorneys
'Amer. Bar Assoc. Rep. 560 (914).
2

Johnson v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 151 N. W. Rep. 125 (915).
'In what manner the claim was solicited does not appear and apparently
.was considered of no importance by the court.
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advanced money to their client with which to pay living expenses
and hospital bills during the pendency of the case, while he was
unable to earn anything. The contract further provided that the
costs of litigation should be paid by the attorneys, and that they
should be reimbursed therefor from the gross amount received from
the proceeds of the action. The court held that the transaction did
not constitute champerty or maintenance and that it was not against
public policy. The court said: "We may have our individual opinions on these propositions as questions of good taste or legal ethics.
But in the absence of some statute, we are unable to hold that it is
illegal or against public policy for an attorney to solicit a case." It
has been held, however, that to solicit causes of action tends to
promote litigation and to degrade the profession and that not only
was a contract made by an attorney with a client in consequence of
solicitation invalid, but that also the attorney was not entitled to
recover quantum meruit for the services rendered by him.' The
latter view is strictly in accordance with the canons of ethics of the
American Bar Association, in which it is provided,5 inter alia, "It
is disreputable . . . to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of
action in order to secure them as clients."
Authorities are greatly at variance as to what elements constitute champerty and maintenance. Blackstone defined the latter as
"an officious intermeddling in a suit that no way belongs 'to one,
by maintaining or assisting either party, with money or otherwise,
to prosecute or defend it". 6 Champerty is a species of maintenance
and includes the additional element of sharing in the possible proceeds of the litigation.7 One of the commonest instances of such
profit-sharing is exemplified in contracts by an attorney for a con-8
tingent fee, which, as a general rule, are not regarded champertous,
unless they are unreasonable or unconscionable, as where it is clear
that advantage has been taken of the client's poverty. 9 Most mod'Ingersoll v. Coal Creek Co., 117 Tenn. 263 (19o6), in which case the
attorney went to the scene of a disaster and solicited numerous injured persons to intrust him with the prosecution of their rights of action. It has
been decided that a contract whereby an attorney agrees to pay for business
brought to him is void. In re Clark, 184 N. Y. 222 (i9o6) ; con4ra, Vocke v.
Peters, 58 Ill. App. 338 (1895).
§28. Disbarment is therein advocated as a penalty for stirring up litigation.
44 Comnentaries, 135.
T
Ibid.
"Wisely or unwisely, a point on which opinions may differ, the law has
long been settled that such [i. e., contingent] fees are lawful and enforceable by the courts, and something more than mere contingency of compensation is necessary to make them champertous." Per Mitchell, C. J., in Williams
v. Phila., 2o8 Pa. 282 (19o4).
'Moorehouse v. Brooklyn, z85 N. Y. 520 (igo6). A contingent fee of

NOTES

ern courts consider that a fair and honest contract for a contingent
fee is as much for the benefit of the client as for the attorney, because
if the former has a meritorious cause of action but no means with
which to pay for legal services unless he can lawfully contract for
a contingent fee to be paid out of the proceeds of the litigation, he
will necessarily be deprived of his remedy, unless he confides his case
to an attorney sufficiently unscrupulous to make a secret illegal agreement.'0 However, in view of the existence of legal aid societies in
many communities, and also the possibility of a poor person suing
in forma pauperis, and of the power of the courts to assign counsel
to litigate the case of a poor client, it is believed that contingent
fees might well be eliminated."' In a few States, a contract for an
attorney's compensation will be deemed champertous where it provides that payment is not only to be contingent on success but also
that such payment is to be made only from the amount recovered
by him for the client. 2 But in the jurisdictions where this principle
is followed, the rule is readily evaded by providing merely that a
percentage of the amount recovered is to be paid after the successful
termination of the suit, and by omitting a provision that the attorney
is to have nothing if unsuccessful."3 According to the weight of
authority, a contract for a share of the proceeds of litigation is not
champertous, unless the attorney carries on the proceedings at his
own expense.'
There are some States in which such a contract is
not champertous, even though the costs of the suit are so paid."5
However, in nearly all jurisdictions, where the suit is for divorce,
a stipulation for the attorney's compensation providing that it is to
be contingent upon the amount of alimony recovered, is illegal.10
As has just been stated, it is generally recognized that an agreement by an attorney to conduct litigation at his own expense, in consideration of all or a part of the recovery, is champertous and unenfifty per cent. is not "unconscionable".

In re Fitzsimmons, 174 N. Y. 15

(19o3).

"Lipscomb v. Adams, 193 Mo. 530 (io6). See also Thornton on Attorneys at Law, Vol. 2, §421, where contingent fees are regarded favorably.

" This view is strongly advocated in Sharswood's "Legal Ethics" (4th ed.),
p. 159 et seq. Committees of the Pennsylvania Bar Association (igo8 and

iO9) and a Committee of the New York Bar Association (igog) have reported against contingent fees. See, also, §13 of Amer. Bar. Assoc.'s Canons
of Ethics.
"Ackert v. Barker, 131 Mass. 436 (1881); Butler v. Legro, 62 N. H. 350
(1883).

The fact that in case of failure, the attorney is to receive a nominal

recompense such as one dollar does not prevent the transaction from being
champertous. Kelly v. Kelly, 86 Wis. 17o (1893).
" Hadlock v. Brooks, 178 Mass. 425 (9O). See also the interesting
opinion in Phillips v. Louisville, etc., Co., 153 Fed. Rep. 795 (1907).

"Jeffries v. Mutual Ins. Co., Iio U. S. 3o5 (1884); Geer v. Frank, 179

Ill. 570 (I899).
"Shelton v. Franklin, 224 Mo. 342 (1909).
"'Neuman v. Freitas, 129 Cal. 283 (igoo).
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forceable. Obviously, an agreement by which the attorney indemnifies the client against costs is no less champertous. 17 But, it is not
against public policy for an attorney to lend his client money with
which to pay the costs of suit, when there is an undertaking for its
repayment, regardless of the outcome.' 8 A fortiori, where the client
is a poor person, it is not improper to make such advances. The law
of champerty and maintenance has never been carried so far as to
render objectionable the rendition of legal services or the giving
of assistance in aid of the litigation of indigent persons. 9 It has
been said that "to investigate the claims or redress the wrongs of
the indigent and the injured is no quixoticism, but a grave and highly
honorable duty of the profession, the performance of which, if not
voluntarily assumed, may be enforced by the court".2" However,
charitable motives are controlling as to whether or not such rendering of assistance constitutes champerty or maintenance. 2 ' There
must be no speculative bargain to participate in the amount recovered.22 In the principal case, the attorneys not only advanced the
expenses of litigation, with an agreement of reimbursement therefor
out of the proceeds, but they also lent the indigent client an amount
sufficient to pay his living expenses and hospital bills. The court
admitted that such a loan "may, in a sense, tend to foment litigation,
by preventing a settlement from necessity; but we are aware of no
authority holding that it is against public policy or of any sound
reason why it should be so considered". It is submitted, however,
that as the facts indicate that there was no purely charitable motive
on the part of the attorneys, and that their interest was purely speculative, the contract should have been held to be champertous.
A.L.L.

Roller v.Murray, 1o7 Va. 527 (io7).
Christie v. Sawyer, 44 N. H. 298 (1862).

"Wallace v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 112 Ia. 565 (igoo); Jahn v. Champagne Lumber Co., 157 Fed. Rep. 407 (igo8); Bristol v. Dann, 12 Wend. i42

(N. Y. 1834).
"Moore v. Campbell, 9 Yerg. 115 (Tenn. 1836).
'Harris v. Brisco, 17 Q. B. D. 5o4 (1886). Cf. Holden v. Thompson,

[197] 2

IK

B. 489.

"Taylor v. Perkins, i57 S. W. Rep.

366 (19o).

122

(MO. 1913) ; Re Evans,

22

Utah,

